ABSTRACT. We combine new concepts of noncooperative coalition theory with an integrated assessment model on climate change to analyze the impact of different protocol designs on the success of coalition formation. We analyze the role of "single versus multiple coalitions," "open versus exclusive membership," "no, weak and strong consensus about membership" and "no transfers versus transfers." First, we want to find out whether and how modifications of the standard assumptions affect results that are associated with the widely applied cartel formation game in the noncooperative game theoretic analysis of international environmental agreements. Second, we discuss normative policy conclusions that emerge from the various modifications. Third, we confront our results with evidence on past international environmental treaties and derive an agenda for future research.
1. Introduction. For a long time, noncooperative game theoretic models on international environmental agreements (IEAs) have almost exclusively based their analysis on the cartel formation game of d 'Aspremont et al. [1983] to study the formation and stability of such agreements.
1 A central result of this literature is that only small coalitions are stable which only marginally improve upon the noncooperative status quo. A closer inspection, see Section 2, reveals that this "pessimistic result" hinges on three assumptions. First, coalition formation is restricted to a single coalition. Second, players can freely join coalitions implying open membership. Third, no consensus about membership is necessary for players to form a coalition. We pursue three objectives in this paper. First, we want to find out whether and how the assumptions of the cartel formation game affect results. Additionally, we are interested in whether the transfer scheme proposed by Chander/Tulkens [1995] , [1997] for enhancing stability in a cooperative global emission game performs equally well in a noncooperative game theoretic framework. In order to achieve this objective, we consider, apart from the cartel formation game, three other coalition games from the recent literature on coalition theory.
2 These coalition games constitute a continuum of assumptions where the assumptions of the cartel formation are gradually relaxed. Moreover, we distinguish between a "no transfer case" and a "transfer case" where in the latter case we adopt the Chander/Tulkens' transfer scheme for our noncooperative game theoretic setting. Together, our set of assumptions gives rise to eight agreement designs for which we determine the set of equilibrium coalition structures. Hence, we can relate the outcome of coalition formation to the issues "single versus multiple coalitions," "open versus exclusive membership" and "no, weak and strong consensus about membership" and "no transfers versus transfers." Moreover, we propose a simple procedure how the choice of the agreement design can be endogenized and analyze its implications.
Second, we want to identify lessons that we can learn for the design of future IEAs in general and for the problem of global warming in particular. This requires that our analysis captures a heterogeneous cost-benefit structure of the various actors involved in climate change and the dynamics of stock pollutants but must also allow us to evaluate different outcomes in ecological and welfare terms. Therefore, we cannot base our analysis on models typically used in the theoretical analysis of IEAs that assume symmetric players and/or a static payoff structure. Instead, our analysis employs an integrated assessment model that closely resembles the seminal RICE model by Nordhaus and Yang [1996] and conducts numerical simulations.
Third, we want to confront our results with the evidence from IEAs in order to construct an agenda of future research. Therefore, we critically relate our results to the past experience with IEAs. Subsequently, we suggest various directions how our model could be modified in order to improve upon the positive aspects of our analysis.
We believe that this paper extends the current literature in several directions. First, there is a conceptual literature that develops new noncooperative concepts for studying coalition formation. 3 To this literature, we can add a small item by showing how the endogenous choice agreement design could be modeled and operationalized in a simple way. Second, there is a theoretical literature that adopts these new concepts for the analysis of IEAs.
4 In contrast to this literature, we cannot only study the implications of different agreement designs on stability but can also evaluate outcomes in welfare and ecological terms because we depart from the assumption of symmetric players and a static payoff structure. Third, there is a literature that combines a climate model with a noncooperative game theoretic model as we do.
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Here, we can add some of the following items that have at least partly been missing in past analyses. a) We pay much attention to the game theoretic underpinning of our model. b) Simulations are based on a fully-fledged climate model. c) We emphasize the relation between the climate and game theoretic module and discuss important properties that drive results. d) We critically confront our results with real world experience on IEAs, identify reasons for discrepancies and provide a research agenda that may help to fix things.
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In the following, we introduce our model (game theoretic and climate module) and discuss important properties in Section 2. In Section 3, we present and explain results of our stability analysis, and, in Section 4, we discuss interpretations and normative policy conclusions. Finally, in Section 5, we identify critical issues for a positive policy analysis and suggest a list of items that may help to improve upon these issues.
Model.
Coalition formation is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, players decide upon their membership in a coalition. In the second stage, coalition members choose their economic strategies. The game is solved by backwards induction. In the following, we describe the decision process in the first and second stage in subsection 2.1 and 2.2, respectively, the procedure of solving the game in subsection 2.3 and we discuss some general features of our model in subsection 2.4.
First stage.
In our model, the set of players P = {1, . . . , N} comprises six elements that are countries or world regions: United States of America (USA), Japan (JPN), European Union (EU), China (CHN), Former Soviet Union (FSU) and "Rest of the World" (ROW). Players decide whether they want to remain a single player or form a coalition with other players. These decisions lead to a coalition structure c = {c 1 , . . . , c M } that is a partition of players where a particular coalition is denoted by c l , l ∈ {1, . . . , M}, c l ∩ c m = ∅ for all l = m, ∪c l = P and c ∈ C where C is the set of all possible coalition structures.
A coalition may comprise only one player (trivial coalition), several players or all players (nontrivial coalition). Similarly, a coalition structure may comprise no, one or several nontrivial coalitions. If all players form a singleton coalition, c N = {{1}, {2}, . . . , {N }}, this implies no cooperation; if all regions are in one coalition (grand coalition), c F = {P }, this means full cooperation; any other coalition structure c P = {c 1 , . . . , c M }, M < N, is referred to as "partial cooperation." In case of six players, there are 203 different coalition structures. Apart from the trivial coalition structure, there are 57 coalition structures with only one nontrivial coalition (single coalition structures) and 145 coalition structures with at least two nontrivial coalitions (multiple coalition structures).
In the following, we consider four "coalition games" that model the decision process of participation differently. We denote these games by names that stress the rules on the formation of coalitions. Since all games assume that players make their decision simultaneously, this feature is not mentioned below anymore.
The first game is the well-known cartel formation game due to d 'Aspremont et al. [1983] that we call Open Membership Single Coalition Game (OMSCG). This game serves as a reference point. In this game, all players can participate in an agreement; players that have no interest in cooperation remain singletons. That is, players choose their membership by announcing either "address" σ i = 0 or σ i = 1. Those players that have announced σ i = 0 remain singletons and those that have announced σ i = 1 are members of a nontrivial coalition, provided at least two players have announced σ i = 1. Thus, in this coalition game, only single coalition structures can emerge. (OM-SCG) . Let the set of membership strategies of player i ∈ P be given by Σ i = {0, 1} where a particular strategy σ i is an announcement of an address and c l is the coalition to which i finally belongs, then
Definition 1. Open membership single coalition game
The second game is called Open Membership Multiple Coalition Game (OMMCG) and is due to Yi and Shin [2000] . This game is similar to the previous game, except that coalition formation is not restricted exante to only one nontrivial coalition. That is, players can freely form coalitions as long as no outsider is excluded from joining a coalition. Players choose their membership by announcing an address between 0 and N . Players that have announced the same address form a coalition, except those that have announced 0 who remain singletons.
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Definition 2. Open membership multiple coalition game (OMMCG) . Let the set of membership strategies of player i ∈ P be given by Σ i = {0, 1, . . . , N} where a particular strategy σ i is an announcement of an address and c l is the coalition to which i finally belongs, then c l = {i} ∪ {j/σ i = σ j = 0}.
The third coalition game is the Δ-game of Hart and Kurz [1983] that we call Exclusive Membership Multiple Coalition Δ-Game (EMMCΔG). Players announce a list of players with whom they would like to form a coalition. Players with the same list form a coalition. For instance, suppose N = 6 and σ 1 = σ 2 = {1, 2, 3}, σ 3 = {3}, σ 4 = {4, 5, 6} and σ 5 = σ 6 = {5, 6}, then c = {{1, 2}, {3}, {4}, {5, 6}} forms. Players 1 and 2 have the same list and therefore form a coalition. The same is true for players 5 and 6. Players 3 and 4 remain singletons. Player 3 is a singleton by its own will and cannot be forced into a coalition with players 1 and 2. In contrast, player 4 is a singleton against his will; he cannot tie up with player 5 and 6 since he is not on their list. In both cases, these players are singletons since membership is exclusive. Definition 3. Exclusive membership multiple coalition Δ-game (EMMCΔG). Let the set of membership strategies of player i ∈ P be given by Σ i = {c l ⊂ P/i ∈ c l } where a particular strategy σ i is a list of players with whom player i would like to form a coalition.
The fourth coalition game is the Γ-game and is also due to Hart and Kurz [1983] . We call this game Exclusive Membership Multiple Coalition Γ-Game (EMMCΓG) which is similar to the previous game. Players also propose a list of players with whom they would like to tie up. However, whereas in the EMMCΓG, it suffices that a subgroup of players on a list makes the same proposal (and hence this subgroup forms a coalition), in the EMMCΓG, a coalition forms if and only if all members on a list make the same proposal. For instance, in the example above with σ 1 = σ 2 = {1, 2, 3}, σ 3 = {3}, σ 4 = {4, 5, 6} and σ 5 = σ 6 = {5, 6}, not c = {{1, 2}, {3}, {4}, {5, 6}} forms, but c = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {5, 6}} instead. Thus, also in the fourth coalition game, membership is exclusive. However, whereas in the EMMCΔG, a weak consensus was required to form a coalition, now in the EMMCΓG, a strong consensus is necessary.
Definition 4. Exclusive membership multiple coalition Γ-game (EMMCΓG). Let the set of membership strategies of player i ∈ P be given by Σ i = {c l ⊂ P/i ∈ c l } where a particular strategy σ i is a list of players with whom player i would like to form a coalition, then, c l = σ i if and only if σ i = σ j for all j ∈ σ i , otherwise c l = {i}.
The four coalition games can be interpreted as four different "membership regimes." As the names suggest, one difference is related to the assumption whether coalition formation is restricted to only one nontrivial coalition (single coalition game) or not (multiple coalition game). A second difference is the assumption open versus exclusive membership. A third difference is related to the assumption of the degree of consensus necessary to form a coalition. In the two open membership games OMSCG and OMMCG, in the EMMCΔG weak and in the EMMCΓG, no strong consensus is needed to form a coalition. Thus, the four coalition games imply a continuum of assumptions. Along the sequence of presentation, gradually one assumption is changed at the time. For reference reason, we denote the set of coalition games by Φ = {OMSCG, OMMCG, EMMCΔG, EMMCΓG}.
Second stage.
In the second stage, players choose their economic strategies. We follow the standard assumption of the valuation function approach, e.g., Bloch [1997] , that, given a coalition structure c = {c 1 , . . . , c M } has formed, players belonging to the same coalition c l jointly maximize the aggregate payoff to their coalition. In our model, this means maximizing aggregate discounted consumption of every coalition c l ∈ c with respect to investment I i,t and the level of abatement μ i,t of every player i belonging to coalition c l for every period t: (1) max
where Z i,t denotes consumption, ρ i is the discount rate of player i and Ψ denotes the time horizon. The underlying model in equation (1) is the CLIMNEG World Simulation Model, an integrated assessment economy-climate model that closely resembles the seminal RICE model by Nordhaus/Yang [1996] . 8 In contrast to RICE, the CWS model allows for different regional discount rates in order to reflect huge differences between world regions in terms of economic development and openness to financial markets. As appears from the Appendix, we assume systematically higher discount rates for developing regions (CHN and ROW) than for industrialized regions (USA, JPN, EU and FSU).
The maximization of (1) is subject to:
This "budget equation" describes how "potential GDP," Y i,t , can be allocated to consumption,
is produced with capital and labor. Capital is built up through investment and depreciates at some fixed rate. Labor supply is assumed to be inelastic. Therefore, investment I i,t is the only endogenous production input and constitutes the first choice variable in the model.
Abatement costs Y i,t C i (μ i,t ) are expressed as "loss of potential GDP": C i is the share of "potential GDP" devoted to abatement which is a function of μ i,t ∈ [0, 1], measuring the relative emission reduction compared to the business-as-usual scenario without any abatement policy. Damages Y i,t D i (ΔT t ) are also expressed as "loss of potential GDP": D i is the share of "potential GDP" destroyed by climate change damages which is a function of temperature change ΔT t . Temperature change depends on the stock of greenhouse gases which in turn depends on emissions that accumulate in the atmosphere. Finally, emissions depend on emissions released through production minus abatement. Hence, the second choice variable in this model is the abatement level μ i,t . Both choice variables (investment and abatement) affect output, abatement costs, damage costs and therefore also consumption not only domestically but also abroad. For abatement, this is immediately evident since remaining emissions (after abatement) increase the stock of greenhouse gases which affects environmental damages in every country. However, this is also true for investment since capital is an input in the production process and atmospheric emissions are proportional to production. Solving (1) simultaneously for every coalition c l ∈ c gives the equilibrium economic strategy vector s * = {I i,t , μ i,t } i∈P ;t=0,... ,Ψ for coalition structure c, abbreviated s * (c). 9 For six players and a period of 35 decades 10 , this vector is of length 2 × 6 × 35. From the assumption of joint welfare maximization, it follows that the economic strategy vector in the coalition structure with only singleton coalitions c N ("no cooperation") corresponds to the "classical Nash equilibrium." By the same token, the strategy vector in the coalition structure with only the grand coalition c F ("full cooperation") is identical to the "classical social optimum." Substitution of the equilibrium strategy vector s * (c) into the payoff functions of players gives a vector of individual (discounted) payoffs for coalition structure c, called valuations,
Performing this exercise for all 203 coalition structures in our model gives a table of valuations of dimension 203 × 6 which we will denote by V (C) in the sequel.
The derivation of valuations above assumes no transfers. We denote this vector by V NT (C). An alternative assumption could be transfers leading to "corrected" valuations V T (C). Among many possibilities, we adopt the transfer scheme used in Eyckmans and Tulkens [2003] which is an extension of the scheme proposed by Chander and Tulkens [1995] , [1997] . This scheme assumes that the surplus of a coalition from cooperation is allocated according to a proportional sharing rule. The payoff of every player i after transfers, being a member of coalition c l in a partially cooperative coalition structure c P , is given by:
That is, the transfer scheme is constructed such that every player receives its noncooperative payoff (first term) and additionally a share λ i from the total surplus of coalition c l in coalition structure c P compared to the singleton coalition structure c N (second term in square brackets). Shares reflect the relation between individual and global marginal climate change damages. Hence, the second term favors countries with relatively high marginal damages since they are entitled to a larger share of the surplus of their coalition. The motivation for this transfer scheme is twofold. First, it can be argued normatively that this transfer scheme embodies a standard notion of fairness: countries that are hurt more by climate change should be compensated more. Second, Chander and Tulkens [1995] , [1997] have shown that this transfer rule gives rise to an allocation in the core in a static cooperative global emission game. Hence, we are interested whether this transfer scheme performs equally well in our dynamic and non-cooperative setting. For later reference, we talk in the following about the "no transfer regime" and the "transfer regime" and denote the set of valuations by
From our explanations and equation (3) it appears that valuations with transfer V T (C) can be calculated ex-post from the valuations with the no transfer valuations V NT (C). This requires a TU-framework such that transfers do not affect the equilibrium economic strategy vectors s * . This holds in our context because we make the following simplifying assumptions.
11 First, budget equation (2) must hold for each region separately. That is, each region can only rely on its own productive resources, at each time t, with consumption not being transferable to other regions. Second, if there are transfers, this implies a reallocation of discounted payoffs in a lump sum fashion among coalition members leaving the sum of the net present values over coalition members unaltered. To see this, note that, in the case of transfers (abbreviated trans i ), the maximization problem described above can alternatively be written as (1 ) m a x
subject to (2) and the restriction that transfers balance within coalition c l , i.e., i∈c l trans i = 0. It is easy to check that problems (1) subject to (2) and (1 ) subject to (2) and the transfer balance condition are equivalent. 12 2.3 Solution of the two-stage game. From subsection 2.2, we know that the decision in the second stage leads to a vector of valuations which is either V NT (C) under the "no transfer regime" or V T (C) under the "transfer regime." Hence, for a given regime in the second stage of the game, players know the implications of their decision about membership in the first stage of the game. From subsection 2.1, we know that the decision process in the first stage can be modeled differently. However, all four coalition games that we consider (Φ = {OMSCG, OMMCG, EMMCΔG, EMMCΓG}) share the feature that players simultaneously announce their membership strategy σ i and the set of announcements σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ N ) is mapped into a coalition structure c = {c 1 , . . . , c M }. Hence, regardless of the specific coalition game, we can define a stable coalition structure as follows:
Definition 5. Stable coalition structures. Consider a coalition game G ∈ Φ and a valuation V (C) ∈ Ω(C). Coalition structure c * ∈ C is called stable if there exists a membership strategy σ * ∈ Σ generating c * such that for all i ∈ P and for all
Definition 5 is the familiar definition of a Nash equilibrium, except that strategies are membership and not economic strategies. In the following, however, we consider a refinement of this stability concept.
Definition 6. Pareto-undominated stable coalition structures. Consider a coalition game G ∈ Φ and a valuation V (C) ∈ Ω(C). Let c * ∈ C * be a stable coalition structure generated by membership strategy σ * ∈ Σ; then c * is called a Pareto-undominated stable coalition structure if there is no other stable coalition structurec * ∈ C * generated by membership strategyσ * ∈ Σ where at least one player is better off and no player is worse off, i.e., there is noσ
The motivation of this refinement is that, even if players behave only in a selfish manner (as we assume), it is difficult to perceive why they should settle for a dominated equilibrium if coordination is costless, as assumed in our model.
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Given that we consider four membership regimes in the first stage of the coalition formation process (Φ = {OMSCG, OMMCG, EMMCΔG, EMMCΓG}), and a no transfer and transfer regime in the second
there are eight possible designs of an agreement. For every design, we determine the set of stable coalition structures, C * (G, V (C)), and the set of Pareto-undominated stable coalition structures,
. This allows us to compare stable coalition structures under various designs as is done in Section 3. However, before embarking on our stability analysis, we first clarify some general features of our model in subsection 2.4.
General features.
A well-known property in the theoretical literature on coalition formation is superadditivity. That is, if players or coalitions merge, and hence the coalition structure changes from c toc, the aggregate payoff to those players involved in the merger increases, i.e., i∈c
That this property may not always be satisfied in the context of externalities has been pointed out by Bloch [1997] . For instance, suppose that a merger leads to an increase of abatement of those players involved in a merger but to a decrease of abatement of outsiders due to "leakage effects." Thus, if leakage effects are sufficiently strong, superadditivity may be violated. However, we have tested numerically all valuations in our model for this property and found that it holds.
Another property that has played an important role in the more recent literature on coalition formation, see, e.g., Bloch [1997] and Yi [1997] , is positive externality. That is, if players or coalitions merge, and hence the coalition structure changes from c toc, the payoff of outsider k increases, i.e., v k (c) < v k (c). Whereas a general proof of this property in a static public good model is rather straightforward, see, e.g., Finus and Rundshagen [2003] , we have not been able to derive an analytical proof in our dynamic public good game. Again, we have checked numerically all valuations in our model for this property and found that it holds.
Both properties allow for the following conclusions: 1) A coalition structurec implies a higher global welfare than a coalition structure c ifc can be derived from c by a merger or sequence of mergers of players or coalitions. In other words, an increase in the "degree of cooperation" has a positive global impact. By superadditivity, the players involved in the merger will be better off and by positive externality, also the outsiders will gain from the merger. Consequently, global welfare in any coalition structure with partial cooperation will be higher than in the coalition structure with no cooperation. By the same token, however, any form of partial cooperation will imply lower global welfare than in the case of full cooperation.
2) Every single player receives in every coalition structure at least his payoff as if there were no cooperation. This property is called profitability and follows from the positive externality property. This is also true for every coalition member under our transfer regime due to the superadditivity property. Recall that under our transfer regime the valuation of a player i is given by v
N the coalition structure with only singleton coalitions (no cooperation), c P any other coalition structure with partial cooperation and λ i > 0. Hence, superadditivity implies that the term in square brackets is always positive. Consequently, all valuations v T (c) ∈ V T (C) are profitable to all players under the transfer regime.
3) Generally, the advantage for a country participating in a coalition is that own abatement efforts are matched by other members' efforts. This reduces the externalities from emissions. This shows up in the superadditivity property which may be interpreted as follows: a coalition can achieve at least as much (and probably more) for its members than if its players remain separately. However, the positive externality property provides incentives for free-riding. Regions can also benefit from cooperation without participating in a coalition. The relative size of both effects determines whether coalition structures are stable. Moreover, apart from transfers, the membership rule has also a crucial impact on stability. We note four relations, see Finus and Rundshagen [2003] for details: a) In every coalition game, profitability is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for stability. The reason is simple: a player can always leave his coalition to become a singleton. Regardless of how the remaining players react, this gives a player at least his payoff of the trivial coalition structure due to the positive externality property. b) In the two open membership games (OMSCG and OMMCG) stand alone stability is a necessary condition for stability. That is, every coalition member must receive a higher payoff than when leaving the coalition to become a singleton while other players remain in their coalitions, i.e., for all i ∈ c l , for all c l ∈ c:
The reason is that a player can always change his address to σ i = 0 to become a singleton which implies that his former coalition c l loses one member. However, stand alone stability is not a sufficient condition for stability in open membership games. Another possible deviation is that a singleton joins a coalition. Additionally, though only in the multiple coalition version, and only if a multiple coalition structure has formed, a member of one coalition can join another coalition. Hence, the number of potentially stable coalition structures is larger in the multiple than in the single coalition game by the very construction of the two games.
In the exclusive membership multiple coalition Δ-game, stand-alone stability is a sufficient condition for stability. The reason is that if every player announces a list of exactly only those coalition members that are in his coalition, any change of his list implies that he becomes a singleton. That is, neither a single player nor a coalition member can join another coalition by exclusive membership, as this is possible in the OMMCG and OMSCG. This is also true in the exclusive membership multiple coalition Γ-game. The only difference to the EMMCΔG is that, due to the requirement of strong consensus, any deviation leads to the breakdown of the coalition to which the deviator belonged. Hence, in the EMMCΓG, a sufficient condition for stability is stand apart stability:
Because of the positive externality property, stand alone stability is a stronger requirement than stand apart stability, i.e., ({i},c) . In other words, the implicit punishment in the EMMCΓG after a deviation is stronger than in the EMMCΔG and in the two open membership games.
Consequently, denoting the set of stable coalition structures in coalition game G and valuation V (C) with positive externalities by C * (G, V (C)), we can conclude:
These relations suggest that multiple coalitions provide an additional option for cooperation, it is easier to sustain cooperation under exclusive membership than under open membership and for exclusive membership it is easier to sustain cooperation under the assumption of strong than under weak consensus. However, theory cannot tell us a) whether the relations above are strict and b) if they are strict, what this means for the global success of cooperation. Even in much simpler models with a static payoff structure and symmetric players, such conclusions cannot be derived which motivates and justifies our objective to analyze this problem with the help of a numerical model. 14 c) Every single coalition structure that is profitable will be stable in the EMMCΓG. This follows immediately from the arguments above that any deviation in this coalition game leads to a breakdown of the coalition to which the deviator belonged. d) The "inclusion chain" of stable coalition structures mentioned under b) is no longer valid for Pareto-undominated stable coalition structures. For instance, suppose coalition structure c is a Pareto-undominated stable coalition structure in the OMMCG. Then, c is also stable in the EMMCΔG but may be Pareto-dominated by coalition structureĉ that is stable in the EMMCΔG but not in the OMMCG. Also the conclusion under point c) has to be qualified under the Pareto-selection criterion. Though a profitable single coalition structure c is a member of C * (EMMCΓG), it may not be a member of C * * (EMMCΓG) if it is Pareto-dominated by another coalition structureĉ that is a member of C * (EMMCΓG).
Results.
In this section, we present results of our stability analysis. The stability check comprises all 203 coalition structures for all 8 agreement designs (4 membership regimes combined with the no transfer and transfer regime, respectively). The test is conducted with an algorithm programmed in GAMS 15 . The results are displayed in Table 1 for the no transfer regime and in Table 2 for the transfer regime based on the parameter values listed in the Appendix. Only those coalition structures are listed that constitute Pareto-undominated stable coalition structures in one of the four coalition games, except for the grey rows that constitute important benchmarks. Coalition structures are listed in descending order of global welfare. From the tables, the following conclusions can be drawn.
Impact of cooperation.
The difference between the first-best and the worst outcome is large in ecological terms. Carbon concentration in the trivial coalition structure (no. 203), corresponding to the classical Nash equilibrium, is more than twice as high as in the coalition structure with the grand coalition (no. 1), corresponding to the global optimum, see the legend of Table 1 . Analyzing the time path of concentration would show that the "Nash equilibrium path" closely follows the business-as-usual scenario, growing steadily over time. In contrast, the "globally optimal path" grows only until 2200 though less steep and declines afterwards.
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In welfare terms, the difference between first-best and worst outcome is with 17.7 trillion US dollars not small in absolute terms, though it seems that 0.52 percent is rather small in relative terms, see the legend of Table 1 . This is due to two main reasons. First, abatement and damage costs constitute only a small fraction of total production and consumption. Second, negative externalities of carbon emissions occur mainly in the future but receive less weight due to discounting. However, looking not only at discounted total values, reveals that differences are quite pronounced. Figure 1 displays the evolution of the difference between full and no cooperation in terms of discounted global abatement and damage costs over time. It is evident that abatement plus damage costs are first dramatically lower under no cooperation than under full cooperation and later this is reversed. The reason is that substantial abatement efforts are required initially under full cooperation which are only 
where welfare is discounted lifetime consumption integrated over 1990 2300, global welfare with full cooperation is 
where the superscript N stands for no and the superscript F for full cooperation.
matched by lower damages in later periods given the stock pollutant nature of greenhouse gases. A similar, though less pronounced, picture is shown in Figure 2 , which depicts the evolution of the difference in terms of global welfare. Thus, it is evident that cooperation would have a substantial impact on abatement and damage costs as well as on global welfare, although discounting and the long time horizon level off differences when looking only at net present values.
It is worthwhile to point out that our simulations are based on a discount rate of 1.5 percent for the industrialized regions and 3 percent for the developing regions. We make this assumption in order not "too overestimate the sense of governments for cooperation." This assumption seems also roughly in line with Weitzman [2001] who suggests that if a constant discount rate has to be chosen in the context of global warming, then a discount rate of 2 percent or less is appropriate to capture long-term effects. In order to test the robustness of our conclusions, we conduct at the end of this section a sensitivity analysis with discount rates that are one third of those above. FIGURE 2. Difference of welfare between full and no cooperation. Difference is computed as:
Participation. From the number of participants, success cannot be inferred. Also the identity of coalition members matters. For instance, a coalition structure with only USA and ROW forming a coalition (no. 141 in Table 1 ) generates larger global welfare than a coalition structure with USA and JPN in one coalition and FSU and ROW in another coalition (no. 148 in Table 1 ). Considering in particular the top coalition structures in Table 2 , together with background information on all coalition structures, it appears that the importance of regions for successful cooperation decreases along the following sequence: ROW, CHN, EU, USA, FSU, JPN. ROW's and CHN's importance derives from cheap abatement because both regions have flat marginal abatement cost curves in our model. An opposite argument holds for JPN which faces a steep marginal abatement cost curve. However, also the slope of the marginal damage cost curve is important. From the assumption of joint welfare maximization, it follows that the steeper this function is, the higher equilibrium abatement levels of coalition members will be. In our model, ROW and EU have steep and FSU and CHN flat marginal damage cost functions.
This explains the importance of EU for the success of cooperation in ecological and welfare terms.
Transfer regime. Transfers can make a difference. In every coalition game, there are many stable coalition structures listed in Table 2 that generate higher global welfare than those listed in Table 1 . For instance, no nontrivial coalition structure is stable in the two open membership games under the no transfer regime whereas under the transfer regime there are five and six, respectively. In the exclusive membership multiple coalition Γ-game, the stable coalition structure with the lowest global welfare (no. 83 in Table 2 ) under the transfer regime generates higher global welfare than the stable coalition structure under the no transfer regime with the highest global welfare (no. 96 in Table 1 ).
The reason for these observations is that, in a world of heterogeneous regions, joint welfare maximization may lead to a very asymmetric distribution of the gains from cooperation without transfers. This may imply that profitability is violated for some coalition members (despite the fact that there is a surplus from cooperation), a necessary condition for stability in every coalition game. However, even when profitability holds, an asymmetric distribution also negatively affects stand alone stability and stand apart stability. Though asymmetry may imply for some participants a "slack of stability," it implies for other members a "lack of stability." That is, though some members receive a higher payoff than would be necessary to ensure stability, for other members just the opposite holds which jeopardizes stability of a coalition.
For instance, assume that China, which is characterized by a flat marginal abatement cost curve and a flat marginal damage cost curve, would form a coalition with Japan for which just the opposite holds. Then, the equilibrium abatement target will be relatively high because of high marginal damages of Japan. Additionally, China has to contribute substantially more to joint abatement than Japan because of its flatter marginal abatement cost curve, but China benefits relatively little in the form of reduced damages because of a flat marginal damage cost curve. Thus, without transfers, no single coalition structure with China as a member of a nontrivial coalition is profitable and therefore stable. Consequently, in the absence of transfers, also full cooperation is not profitable to all participants: in fact, apart from CHN also ROW would lose from cooperation. Generally, asymmetries are so strong that without transfer, no single coalition structure with a coalition of 5 members and only one single coalition structure with a coalition of 4 members is profitable. In contrast, the transfer regime always ensures profitability, see Section 2.4. Moreover, the transfer regime can balance different incentive structures, increasing overall stability.
Membership regime. The membership regime has a crucial impact on stability and the success of cooperation. Four relations are important: a) First, if we allow for the possibility to form multiple coalitions, multiple coalition structures emerge in equilibrium. b) Some of the stable multiple coalition structures imply higher global welfare than stable single coalition structures. For instance, comparing the outcome of the two open membership coalition games which differ only in one feature, then it is evident that in the case of transfers the set of stable coalition structures is identical, except that there is one more coalition structure in the multiple coalition game. This additional coalition structure (no. 83 in Table 2 ) is a multiple coalition structure that generates higher global welfare than any other stable single coalition structure under open membership. Also, in the exclusive membership multiple coalition Δ-game, all Pareto-undominated stable coalition structures are multiple coalition structures under the transfer regime of which many Pareto-dominate stable single coalition structures (e.g. no. 120, 139, 141, 150, 151 in Table 2 ). Only in the case of the exclusive membership multiple coalition Γ-game, the possibility of forming multiple coalitions is less important for global welfare since the implicit punishment is harsh enough to sustain large single coalition structures. c) Exclusive membership leads to a significant number of additional stable coalition structures compared to open membership of which most imply higher global welfare. This is true without exception under the no transfer regime, Table 1 . Under the transfer regime, it is only partially true, Table 2 . However, among the "additional coalition structures," there are always some that lead to higher global welfare. d) A similar conclusion can be drawn when comparing the outcome under weak, i.e., C * * (EMMCΔG), versus strong, i.e., C * * (EMMCΓG), consensus: strong consensus leads to superior outcomes compared to weak consensus. This is particularly evident under the transfer regime. The requirement of strong consensus exhibits a strong enforcement power on coalitions. Basically, players face the decision "take it or leave it," and leave it means a strong implicit punishment that is conducive to stability. Agreement design. Until now, we assumed the agreement design to be given exogenously. However, one can easily perceive that there is a stage 0 in which players decide upon the membership rule Φ = {OMSCG, OMMCG, EMMCΔG, EMMCΓG} and whether there should be transfers (Ω(C) = {V NT (C), V T (C)}). There are certainly many ways to model the decision process in stage 0. We choose here a simple option. First, given that there is no unique stable coalition structure under most agreement designs, we assume that all equilibria are equally likely for a particular design. Second, we compute the average expected individual welfare for every player for each of the eight agreement designs. Third, we check Pareto-dominance relations between the eight designs. Thus, our procedure means introducing a "constitutional period" in which players decide under the "veil of ignorance" upon the agreement design. It turns out in our model that the design EMMCΓG and V T (C) Pareto-dominates all other designs. That is, if players decide in stage 0 simultaneously upon the regime in stage 1 and 2, all players would unanimously vote for exclusive membership with strong consensus and the implementation of transfers.
Discounting. Until now, all results were based on the assumption of a discount rate of 1.5 percent for industrialized regions and 3 percent for developing regions. Assuming only one third of these values, i.e., 0.5 and 1.5 percent, respectively, has the following implications.
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First, the impact of cooperation becomes larger. This is particularly true in terms of global welfare. Whereas previously the difference of the net present value between full and no cooperation was 0.52 percent in relative terms, it is now 2.28 percent. Thus, lower discounting makes cooperation more attractive from a global point of view. Second, stable coalition formation becomes more successful not only in absolute but also in relative terms. For each of the eight scenarios, closing the gap index of stable coalition structures is on average substantially higher with lower discount rates than displayed in Tables 1 and 2 . This is in line with intuition which suggests that the incentive for cooperation increases with lower discounting because the long term benefits from cooperation receive more weight. Third, all qualitative conclusions from above are confirmed. That is, the composition of members is more important than the number of participants for the success of an agreement, transfers improve upon the prospects of successful cooperation, membership rules make a difference where multiple coalitions, exclusive membership and a strong degree of consensus have a positive impact on the outcome of stable coalition formation compared to single coalitions, open membership and a weak degree of consensus, respectively. Also endogenizing the agreement design leads to the outcome on which we reported above.
Interpretations and conclusions.
General remarks. The results highlight that the assumptions associated with the cartel formation game, frequently applied in the analysis of international environmental agreements, substantially affect conclusions. It is evident that all classical assumptions (single coalition structure, open membership and no consensus for coalition formation) imply rather pessimistic predictions about the success of cooperation. Relaxing each of these assumptions gives rise to additional stable coalition structures that perform better in welfare and ecological terms in our numerical simulations.
Transfer regime. Our results confirm the conjecture that cleverly designed transfers can foster the success of cooperation if actors have different interests. In particular, an efficient climate policy must be accompanied by compensation measures in order to induce participation of the key producers of cheap abatement like China and the "Rest of the World" (comprising mainly developing countries). Our simulations reveal that the Chander/Tulkens' transfer scheme adopted in this paper is capable of providing the necessary compensations. Thus, our results support the efforts in more recent IEAs, like the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Montreal Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol to set up a fund that provides financial support to developing countries in order to encourage participation and cover their additional abatement costs. The permit trading system under the Kyoto Protocol will also imply transfers that may balance asymmetries, given the fact that trading occurs voluntarily.
Membership regime.
Our results suggest that the effort to get as many countries into one "climate boat" may not always be the good strategy in the presence of strong free-rider incentives. This is at least true; if not, such harsh implicit punishments are available as assumed in the exclusive membership multiple coalition Γ-game and/or if no or only limited transfers are available to balance asymmetries. If no large coalitions are stable, allowing for separate agreements among regions that have similar interests may foster the success of international agreements. In our model, regions with similar interests are solely characterized by their benefit and cost structure, though in reality, also regional and cultural similarities may play some role. In this light, the position of the USA only to ratify the Kyoto Protocol if also developing countries would take on climate responsibility has to be evaluated critically.
19 However, their announcement in the aftermaths of their withdrawal that they would pursue their own climate policy cooperating with countries of similar interests may be seen less critical. At least as an intermediate step, multiple agreements may be useful on the way to a global treaty as this is often the case with regional trade agreements that lead to more comprehensive agreements at later stages.
The results also suggest that open membership as applied in almost every international environmental treaty should not be taken for granted. In particular, considering other international agreements or organization, it turns out that exclusive membership is no exception. For instance, NATO and WTO vote by unanimity on new members. Also accession of the ten new member states in the European Union required a two-step decision procedure. First, accession had to be accepted by the European Parliament by a simple majority and subsequently the European Council had to approve the accession by unanimity. Hence, our results suggest that club good agreements, e.g., NATO, European Union and WTO, may not only enjoy a higher stability and success because the benefits from contributions are exclusive to members, but also because membership is exclusive. Though more members means more contributors, it may also mean "more instability" that may be counterproductive.
Closely related to exclusive membership is the degree of consensus needed to form a coalition. Here our results suggest that a high degree of consensus upon membership may not be an obstacle but in fact may be conducive to successful cooperation.
Participation. Ignoring the "favorable" agreement design under exclusive membership multiple coalition Γ-game and transfers (in which case large single coalition structures are stable), then our results question the commonly held view that a high participation also means success. They stress the importance to include key players in international climate policy. On the one hand, agreements should include regions that perceive the benefits from reduced environmental damages to be high and therefore push for high abatement targets. In our model, this attaches much importance to the European Union. On the other hand, regions that can provide cheap abatement should participate. In our model, this attaches a key role to China and developing countries (ROW). Obviously, this aim has to overcome free-rider incentives fundamental to climate change policy, reinforcing the need for transfer and/or differentiated abatement targets.
Discounting. It is certainly not surprising that our model confirms the well-known result that discounting is important for the absolute and relative gains from cooperation in the context of global externalities. However, it is interesting that our model shows that discounting is equally important for the success of IEAs if free-rider incentives are explicitly taken into account. This reinforces the importance and policy relevance of the discussion about "appropriate discount rates" for sustainable development as for instance discussed in Chichilnisky [1997] .
Extensions and issues for future research.
Despite our results providing some guidance for the design of future IEAs, some evidence is puzzling from a positive point of view. We name four issues.
The first issue is participation. Under the no transfer regime, predicted membership in stable coalition structure seems not in line with expectations. For instance, one may wonder why ROW and USA are frequently members of coalitions whereas EU is only part of two coalitions. Under the transfer regime, high participation, including the grand coalition, in the exclusive membership multiple coalition Γ-game makes it difficult to understand the real world problems associated for instance with the Kyoto Protocol.
The second issue is single versus multiple coalitions. Despite the fact that it is certainly true that it is easier to consider different individual interests in multiple coalitions rather than in a single coalition, this explanation may not convince all critics. For instance, one could object that a differentiation of abatement duties could also be established within one coalition. Moreover, also the assumption of joint welfare maximization leads to some form of differentiation of abatement targets, though to a very special one: all participants must comply with a cost-efficient allocation of abatement levels and with the implied aggregate abatement level.
The third issue is open versus exclusive membership. As pointed out above, almost all existing IEAs have no provision to restrict membership. Thus, one may wonder why exclusive membership has not emerged as a superior membership rule if the advantages according to our results are so obvious. The fourth issue is the degree of consensus about membership. Though consensus decisions are frequently observed in international environmental politics, they typically apply to the policy level rather than to participation.
Subsequently, we suggest some reasons that could explain these puzzles and propose some possibilities to improve upon the explanatory power of our model in terms of a positive analysis.
First, all four coalition games assume that players decide simultaneously upon their participation. However, casual empirical evidence suggests that signature and ratification of environmental treaties occur sequentially. Typically, some initiators kick off the negotiation process, a core group of countries participate in an agreement and other countries may follow suit at a later stage. However, modeling coalition formation as a sequential process introduces a couple of conceptual problems that are difficult to solve. For instance, in the case of heterogeneous players, the sequence in which players decide upon participation or make proposals for coalitions has to be endogenized. Also in models like ours with a dynamic payoff structure with substantially more than two periods, the number of strategic options for participation increases dramatically. Hence, it is not surprising that the sequentially move unanimity game of Bloch [1995] has only been applied so far to symmetric players and to games with a static payoff structure, e.g., Ray and Vohra [2001] and Yi [2000] . Moreover, this game assumes that players cannot revise their membership once they have decided upon participation. Also Rubio and Ulph [2003] who consider a sequential version of the open membership single coalition game assume symmetric players and a very simple payoff function for analytical tractability. Nevertheless, we believe that tackling these conceptual problems will add much to the understanding of the design of actual international environmental treaties.
Second, in all four coalition games, reactions after a deviation follow from the membership rule. Thus, reactions do not follow from ad hoc assumptions. Nevertheless, reactions may not be those actually taken by countries. It may be overly pessimistic to expect that a deviation does not trigger any reaction at all as implied by the two open membership games and the exclusive membership multiple coalition Δ-game. However, it may also be considered as overly optimistic that deviation triggers a breakdown of an agreement as implied by the exclusive membership multiple coalition Γ-game. Of course, it is difficult to predict what kinds of reactions are "correct." This would require an empirical analysis that obviously faces a bundle of problems associated with the gathering of data. However, also from a theoretical point of view, this issue is not straightforward. For instance, one may argue that reactions should constitute a best reply, an idea that is for instance captured by the notion of a farsighted equilibrium as proposed by Chwe [1994] . Roughly speaking, a coalition structure is stable if no player has an incentive to deviate, taking all reactions and counter reactions into account. Not surprisingly, this concept is difficult to operationalize in the context of more than three players because the chain of reactions may be very long. Thus, some simplification may be necessary as assumed for instance by the concept of an equilibrium binding agreement proposed by Ray and Vohra [1997] .
Third, our empirical model divides the world into only six regions. In particular, the player "Rest of the World" (ROW) includes many countries. This implies that very heterogeneous interests within this group of countries are "homogenized" by assumption. Moreover, summing damages over many countries, even though individual countries may have low damages, leads to high damage costs estimates at the aggregate. Hence, our model probably overestimates the interest of ROW in cooperation and therefore also generally the prospects of cooperation. This qualification would call for a model with more disaggregated data. However, there is no doubt that this would require a substantial amount of additional computer resources. For instance, extending the analysis from 6 to "only" 12 players increases the number of possible coalition structures that have to be checked for stability already from 203 to over 4 billion.
Fourth, the parameter values of our empirical model are based on the RICE model by Nordhaus and Yang [1996] . As it is well known, e.g., IPCC [2001] , there is a lot of uncertainty about the "correct estimates" and model assumptions vary widely. In any case, all current models are based on "objective" estimates about abatement and damage costs that may differ from the "subjective" evaluation of governments. For instance, there is some reason to believe that the subjective perception of damage costs of China and ROW is substantially lower than the objective estimates assumed in our model. This may be because these governments consider only a short planning horizon or simply value damages caused by global warming less than we assumed in our model. Consequently, China and ROW (and probably also other regions in our model) would have virtually no incentive to participate in cooperation. An obvious way to improve upon the estimates for a positive analysis would be to use data from contingent valuation studies to calibrate an empirical model. For instance, Böhringer and Vogt [2004] suggest from a survey of various studies that the willingness to pay for global greenhouse gases is even in industrialized countries rather low. However, it is also evident from their survey that the current data basis is very small, only few country studies are currently available.
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Fifth, following the mainstream literature on coalition formation, we assumed that players choose their economic strategies by maximizing the aggregate welfare to their coalition. However, casual empirical evidence suggests that in reality abatement allocation is neither costefficient nor is the aggregate abatement level optimal. That is, this assumption seems to overestimate the sense of cooperation among governments but also neglects the complicated political decision process within countries (Carraro and Siniscalco [1998] , Endres [1997] ). Hence, one way to improve upon the predictive power of coalition models could be to include public choice aspects in the analysis like interest groups, governmental decision processes and parliamentary voting. However, apart from increasing the complexity of models, we expect that it will be difficult to identify and quantify political variables for an empirical analysis.
Sixth, we assumed lump sum transfers for simplicity. This was consistent with our stability analysis where participation decisions are based on discounted payoffs. In reality, however, it seems reasonable to expect that transfers are paid and negotiated over time. We expect that this will imply that transfers appear to be a less straightforward instrument for improving the prospects for cooperation and hence cooperation between heterogeneous players will be more difficult to achieve. However, given the complexity of dynamic models, this conjecture may be premature and would have to be analyzed in an extended framework. A promising route of research could be along the lines of Germain et al. [2003] . However, no doubt, this would require much additional conceptual work since their cooperative game theoretic analysis is restricted to transfers within and stability of the grand coalition whereas our framework considers all forms of partial cooperation.
Seventh, we computed open-loop Nash equilibria in the second stage of the coalition formation game. A more sophisticated alternative would be closed-loop Nash equilibrium strategies as for instance considered in Dockner and Long [1993] and Rubio and Casino [2002] . The impact of our simplification is difficult to assess as there are no general results available. On the one hand, following Fudenberg and Tirole [1991] , we expect the difference between both concepts to be small. They argue that open-loop strategies are good approximations of closed-loop strategies in games in which players have little influence on the other players' optimal strategies. In our simulation model, this influence is rather small because of the strong rigidity of the carbon cycle in the climate model. 21 On the other hand, if there are differences, then we expect less stable agreements for closed-loop than for open-loop strategies. This seems suggestive considering Germain et al. [2003] who note for their model that global emissions tend to be higher under closedloop than under open-loop strategies because there is more room for strategic behavior.
Finally, though we believe that our approach of modeling the choice of the agreement design endogenously is novel and an important step, we acknowledge that it is only a first step. In particular, the decision was restricted to only eight designs of agreements, and, in the case of transfers, we considered only one compensation rule of possibly many others. Moreover, as pointed out above, the choice of abatement was fixed through the assumption of joint welfare maximization. In reality, however, one would expect that all aspects of agreement design are negotiated as a package and are therefore also strategically linked. Taking this concern seriously means to endogenize all features of the design of an agreement. This is certainly a challenging task for future research. However, first attempts to develop such a "new" framework by Maskin [2003] seem promising, though we expect that implementation in an empirical model will be anything else than trivial. 17. An alternative way to increase the gap between the full cooperative and noncooperative outcome could be to change the objective function in (1) by giving more weight to the distant future as for instance suggested in Chichilnisky [1997] .
18. Detailed results are available from the authors upon request.
19. In 1997, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed the Byrd-Hagel resolution which makes "meaningful" participation of developing countries a conditio sine qua non for ratification (The Byrd-Hagel Resolution, U.S. Senate, 12 June 1997, 105th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Resolution 98).
20. It is evident that this line of research would contrast to our exercise at the end of Section 3 where we lowered the discount rates. This highlights the controversy between normative and positive policy issues in the analysis of international environmental agreements.
